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Introduction
As Selb (forthcoming ) observes. the standard measure of (posterior) competitiveness in elections used in plurality contests, no1meiy the difference between the winner o1nd the second pio1ce finisher, has no "self-evident counterpart in multi-member PR districts".2 For PR elections under quota rules such o1S d'Hondt o1nd Sainte-Lague, Selb (forthcoming) proposes, to use the weighted gap between the electoral quotient of the party winning the mth and final o Initially pr~nted ~t tile Annu~l Meeting of the Eu ropean Public Chole<: Society, Jena. Germany. Th e first-named ~uthor is indebted for r~~«:h n lpport to the Jack w. Petlnon (Bren Foundation ) Endowed Ch~ir and to the Social Sciences and Humanities Rewa«:h Coundl of C.nad~ (SSHRCC)Crant #410-2007-2153 . to srudy "Politic:.i.l Competition-(co-PIs: SunleyWiner. and J. Slephen Fc:rris). We ~re both indebted to Sue lud eman and Clover ~hrend-Gethard for bibliographic assiMince .
• Corresponding author. seat and the electoral quotient of the closest loser as a measure of competitiveness. This measure seems a natural generalization of what is commonly done for the single seat case. However, there are other ways to generalize the measure of competitiveness used in plurality elections. Following lines similartoTaagepera and Grofman (2003) we identify six properties that any index of competition should satisfy, and then otTer a new measure that satisfies all six properties which is applicable to virtually any electoral rule. By contrast, for example. the Selb (forthcoming) measure so1tisfies only two of these six properties.
We believe any measure of competitiveness should have the following properties :
( l)The measure should be party-specific, i.e .. it should o1l1ow for the possibility that voters of different parties might have different incentives to turn out to vote.
(2) For each party, the measure should run from zero to 1; with 0 indicating situations where voter incentives to First publ. in: Electoral Studies 28 (2009), 2, pp. 291-296 Konstanzer (5) The measure should be sensitive to the nature of the voting rule being used. In polrticular. we propose tholt it should vary with the Threshold of Exclusion of tholt rule.
(6) For two-candidolte pluraliry elections. the measure should reduce to a simple function of the difference in vote share between the winner olnd the loser.
These six properties olre .111 intuitively reolsonolble ones, but the underlying theory tholt undergirds Ihem is one tholt is neo-Downsioln in cholracter in tholt we tolke incentives for turnout to be relolted to the likelihood tholt blocs of voters might be pivotoll. The smolller the bloc of voters tholt needs to changes its votes to affect: the outcomes for any given party, either to make it better off or to make it worse off, the greater the incentives for members of that party to turn out to vote, either to keep what they have or to make additionoll golins. And the greolter the incentives of polrty leolders to pour resources into mobilizoltion efforts. Nonetheless, although there olre neo-Downsioln ideas that inspired the authors to develop this measure of competition. even if one is not sympolthetic to the roltionoll choice ideol of pivotal (bloc) voting power that we drolW upon, the measure of competition tholt we propose still has very olttrolctive properties for olny one interested in measuring competitiveness in .1 comparable way across different ) Of cou~. we could just as easily h~v~ res<aled so ilS 10 create a meoiSUTe running from. s~y. minus infinity to plus infinity. The point is simply to have iI metric th~t hilS ~n intuitively interpret.abl~ me~ning.
~ Sec previous footTlO(e.
5 The possible plural is insened here to ~lIow us 10 de~ w ilh methods such as plurillity bloc voting with pany-line voting. where iI SWitch in VOles might affect multiple e.a1S it once. electoral rules and across different parry and party strength settings. 6 We will illustrate our ideolS olbout how to measure competitiveness in a fully general way applicable to multiseat multiparty contests and not just two party competition with the three party five seat d'Hondt list PR example used by Selb (forthcoming). The example is shown in Table 1 (along with the relevant divisor quotients). This example looks at competition within a single election but. in principle, the concept we propose can be used to develop more aggregated measures of mean competition or range of competition over time or among or across cases.
Let us first look at turnout incentives from the standpoint of Party c. 7 Here, there are two cases that need to be investigated. On the one hand, supporters of Parry C might be concerned to turn out in order to increase the likelihood that ParryCwould ~ a second seat; on the other hand. supporters of party C might be concerned to turn out in order to insure that Parry C does not lose the seat it already what rational choice models un do is help explain how the levels of turnout at b.iU parks m ight vary as _ c,,",ng., lhe prices of tickets (rel~tive to OIher .ctivities that might be substituted for a day/ night ~t the old ball game). Franklin (2004: 31) also builds on the insight that we should try toexp!din turnout variations across elections but looks as well at turnout variation u .J(TOSS groups of people (e.g~ generational cohorts) and over time (see also Hanks and Crofman.1998) . He integrates in to a rational choice model the notion th at "citizens are soOdliled into the habit of voting or not voting during their firsl elections~ (Franklin. 2004: 32) . CLlrke et at (2004. chapters 7-S ) identify !WO broad appro.a~s: sociological and ra!iOllal choice. with the former divided into th~ models (perceived CQuity/faimess. social capildl dnd civic volunwism ) and the t.mer dpproach also divided into three models (cognilive mobi lizatioo. minimaUst. and general incenri~s). It is the second of these latter dpproaches that is dosest to the approach commonly .Jttributed to Downs (19Sn but Clarke et at do not require that instrument incentives be based on a purely ind ividuali stic calcullIS. CI~rke et al provide ~ number of comparisons of the empirical power of the various models they deKribe. Other important recent theoretical and empirical W1)fi( on turnout has been done by Andre Slais (Slals. 2006 (Slals. : 81als and !\arts. 2006 (Slals. : 81ais et al_ 2000 , Here. however. we do not need to adjudiute among compet ing approaches to expl.lin ing turnout. since our dnswers to the specific problem we ~re interested In solving. ndmely developing a full general meoiSure of competition. does not really depeod upon how we think about turnout. although we cettainly W1)uld hOl>l' that, empiriully. the measure we offer would be related to turnout (~ below).
1 Note that we are deliberately expres.sing incenti~s for turnout as linked to ~rty incentives to mobil ize voters. Following Jacobson ( 19S3): see also Cox. 1999) . w e think that this is the most pl~usible ~xplanatio n for the turnout-<omPf'tition linkage. However, the apprOilch to competit~~s.s we offer .Jlso applies if we believe. a la Oowru; {1957J, that V1)ter perceptions of the likelihood that Iheir VOles might c,,",nge outcomes arrl'cts the Pfobability thatthcy will go to the polls.
T .. blll' 1
Ex~mpll'used bySelb(fo!'thcoming). T~b\1I' 2. Thfll'e partill's. flv", seats to bII' has. Both for purposes of c.llculating seat loss and for purposes of calculating seat gain, we shall use the respec· tive worst case scenarios to calculate the incentive for turnout.
For Party C to be sure togain a second scat i( would need to gain an additional 16.34 percentage points of vote share; since no matter how the accompanying vote loss is distributed among the remaining two parties, PartyC is still guaranteed two seats (since 0.3334f2 > 0.6663f4). While there are scenarios in which Party C could gain a seClt with an even lower vote share gain, these lower percentages do not guarantee a second seat.
For Party C to lose its only seat taking the present distribution of vote shares for other pdrties as fixed, it would need to lose only 2+ percentage points of vote share, since that would bring it below the vote share level of the highest losing quotient of 0.15 (see the second entry in the Party B column). However, for Party C to lose a seat under the worst case scenario -one in which clny vote shclre it lost would go to Party B -a loss of just over 1.33 percentage points of its vote share would result in a lost seat, since the solution to (0.30 + x ){2 = 0.17 -x is giVen by x = .0133.
How sho!.ll we characterize the magnitude of Party Cs incentives to turn out supportersi' Well, under d'Hondt, for each 1/6+ vote share a party can guarantee an additional scat,S Le., l/(m + 1) = 1(6= 0.1667 is the Threshold oJ Exclu· sion (~) for a d'Hondtvoting rule with m = 5 (see Rae et aI., 1971) . It thus seems to us to be "natural"' to initially "normalize" values of our index of competition by the Threshold ofExc/usion since a gain (loss) of one Threshold of Exclusion percentage point share of votes will always give rise to the possibility of a gain (loss) of one seat, and thus provides cln upper lxIund on the magnitude of the vote share shiftthan could change outcomes plus or minus one seat.
We will use whichever of the gain and loss calculations gives the party the maximum incentive to turn out its supporters. Thus. in this example, wc shall take the incen· tive for Party C (0 mobilize its supporters to turn out as 10 In e loooral sys{!'ms wh l'r!' distri{I~leYel legal thresholds [r. ) .Ipply, {his Irnn should colTII'spond {O thll' IlI'g.ll IhreShold if $;"" 0 OInd r. > rE.
Equally. leg~l Ihfli'silolds h.lvl' 10 bII' considll'rll'd wh!'n cdlcula{ing worst c.se scen.lri05 regarding se.lt loSses.
".
In gener.lI, for party i, the incentive for that party's supporters [0 turn out (given some observed or predicted vote share allocation ) can be written as (6) where we express the vote losses and gdins in the expres· sion above as franions of [oral vo tes cast. 1fwe denote the above expressio n, which we ITIdY tclke to be the Index a/Competition for parry i, as Ci. then, within any given district the overall Index of Competition, C, is simply a weighted average of the competition index vclluf's of the individual parties, where the weights are the Vi values, Le" the vote shares of each of the parties. Thus, we may write
For the Selb cX.lmple shown in Table 1 . we can calculate that [ equals 0.53 x 0.81 + 0.30 x 0.76 +0.17 x 0.94 = 0.82.
Real word eumples
Below we present ulcu tations of the I ndex of Competition for a set of real world elections: the Swiss National Council elections 1971-2007. 11 Switzerland features one of the very f~ "districted proportional representation" systems where district magnitude varies over the whole range from Single seat to large 35-member districts and where eventual dispmportionalities emanating from the translation of votes into seats at the district level are not corrected at higher tiers (see Monroe and Rose, 2002) . Thus, Swiss National Council elections provide an ideal experimental ground for studying the properties of the competition index.12 First, how does C vary with the Threshold of Exclusion? As Cox (1999) argues in his reflections on Downs' decisiontheoretic model of turnout. the intensity of competition should be more variable both over space and time, and therefore lower on average in districts of lower magnitudes, i.e., districts with higher -rE. A descriptive table that shows means and variances of the key variables is given in Appendix: the Appendix also has a table that reports the bivariate correlations among our variables. As we see, the correlation between our index of com petition and -rE has the expected negative sign.
11 STATA code tltat implements the index is ~vail~ble from the authors. 12 SWiturland is divided into 26 electoral districts. The ob5i:rvalion period includes 10 elections. SOfTIe 5ing~mem~r distrkts IlI!l d ~t .cit elections" during the observation period. i.e .• no Cilldidau: clu.llenging the incu m~nt was nomillated (i.e. non-competitivern'ss in txrremo).
Moreover. one district was not established until 1979. Thertfore. our panel includes 253 instead of 260 district-year observations. Stats are allocd ted according 10 till! Hagenb.lch-Bl$choff (d:.a. Jtfftl'$Oll) mt thod, not d·Holldt. For ~ proof of equiva lenCf: of the: H.gtnbolCh-Bischoff . nd d'HO!1dt mtthods. SI'<: G~uglhofcr (19BB~ The Swiss f:1«lofal system also provides for the opporlunity to run joint li sts in multi-mem~r districts in order to ~void w.IStd votes. This may occ.sion.lly imp.c! on the allocation of sed ts. Due to a I. ck of data. We could only p;nI;~lIy account for joilll lists. In other instances. Wf: therefort do .IS ifthcrt weft nojnint lists. Morwver. election s to the federa l ch~mt.,r of the parli.ment. the Council of St~tes. are simu ltanf!Ousty held in moSl districts. Wt will also ignorf: potential spilt-over effe<ts from these el<':CIions in our .naJysis, . . .5
Threshold of E)(clusion fig. 1 1971-2007. This data suggests that the Cox expectation is satisfied: the higher re. the greater the variability of competition. and the lower the average level of competition. Lower re. in turn, seems to guarantee that elections will almost always .be competitive at the district leve1. 13 However. it is important to check for non-linearities. The Fig. 1 bivariate scatterplot also includes a LOESS line which smooths the data to present a clearer picture. We can see from Fig. I that the link between C and 1f., though essentially monotonic. is also nonlinear.
The data shown in Fig. 1 would lead us to expect turnout to be more variable and lower on average with rising re. In order to test this conjecture, we set up a simple heterocedastic regression model 14 where both mean turnout and the (log of the ) turnout variance about this mean is cl function of re plus a secular trend as a con trol variable. ls The Ml-estimates are reported in Table 2 (Model 1). As expected, re has a highly significant negative effect on mean turnout. and a strong positive effect on turnout variability.
I) This e)lpect'~tion goes against tha t of work by scholars such as Oahl and Tuftt (1973) on consti tuency population effe<ts. which argues tltat smdller districts (as measul'f:d by population) wm. celrris paribus. lu.ve higher tumout. sinct we would e~pcct thU districts with a large num~r 01 Sl'ats (and thw; low~) will also t., larger in population ttrms_ Se<': also discussion in ~mer (unpubliShed).
,. ~. for f:umple. Harvcy ( 1 976~ The model consists of ~ mf:in function : Turnout _ ~o + ~, " fE + (11 " Trend + t. and i varUnre fullClion; Vand -ap(yo + YI ,,~+ v) wt1ich c~n ~ simulwleously filled wilh Max imum Ukelihood. Wf! report robustsundard errors that .i«(lUllt for Iill-p'nel structure of the dat.L IS Nalion.I-level turnout in Switzerland has declined dram~tic.lty from the l~u: 1960s on. rNinly due to an informal agref:ment among the four largest pol itic.ll p' rties -Ih.i t cod ified the composition of the IUtionaJ govt'fnmf: nt in 1959 (.n event closely related to the nOlion of nationat compttition; see foot note 16). and due to the late female enfr~ ment in 1971 (see Franklin. 2OG4) . for the time being. we wilt consider such naliorul-level developmenl as a nuiQnce in eSlimaling the effects of interest. For the same reason. we have excluded one districl where voling is compulsory (Scha{fhausen). since compulsory voting presumably distorts the competition-turnout nexll!.. Second and most importantly, does C capture real mobilization and turnout incentives? The bivariate correlation between ( and turnOul reported in Appendix is, as expected positive and strongly significant. Fig. 2 shows the bivariate scanerplotbetween (and turnout, and again includes a LOESS tine which smooths the data to present a clearer picture. From To look ,n the relationship between C and turnout in more depth we include C into the equation predicting mean turnout in order to check whether unequalleve!s of competition account for the previously observed panem of turnout variability (see Table 2 , Model 2~ Indeed. C retains a strong positive impact on turnout. corroborating our expectation that parties' mobilization efforts and voter turno ut are highly responsive to political competition, and that a simple posterior measure of competition such as C captures these incentives quite well. 16 ln fact. the previously observed effect of r£ on mean turnout reduces with the inclusion of C, while the effect on turnout variance is no longer significa nt at conventional levels, indicating that uneven levels of competition usefully help us aocount for the lower net turnout and higher turnout variability in smaller districts. 17
Discussion
The method proposed in this paper to create an index of competition that can be used to estimate incentives for 16 Sec Cox (1999) for an el~boration of Ihe theoretiu l ~rgumt'nl. ~nd Selb (forthcoming) for cross-n.nional t'mpiric~1 fyidt'nct'. t7 Our findings !naY . Iso shoo soon .. lighl on a phcnomt'non th~t hu long puzzled comp~r~liv" ~lectOf~1 restarc:h: Ih~t turnoUI ;s higher on ~ver~c ullder proportion.\! repr~nt~tion ( PR) m.iIl in mOljorit~ri.an ., [CCloral Syslcom (c.g .. 8lais, 2006; BE~is and A'; lIts, 2006) , yl'l turnout l11dy nOI incrc~SI' as the number ofparties inueases-Our findings suggesl thAllower n~1 turnout in sing[l'-mcmber plur~ljty systems m~y be linked 10 uneven turnOUI over districtS. which in lurn is .It lust parti~lIy • consrquence of vuyint inlensities of loc.II·level competition. oot Il\.)t lurnout in PR S1'~IS m~y no t li ne~rly incre~se with .n inerea5t' in district I11dgnirude, and thus m.ly not linearly incre~SI' with Ihe nu mber of (effective) parties. We might also note that. in the US and in other first-past Ihe posl sysleom. some dislricu ~re hig.hly noncompetitive, ~nd turnout is often low in wch districts absent countervailing factors such as Iht presence of simultaneously held elections of ~ more competitive fIollu ...... turnout is certainly not the only possible approach. In particular. there are other (closely related) ways to think about incentives for turno ut. For example. we might use "best case" instead of "worst case·· scenarios. Or, we might use the "best case·' scena rio for seat gain and the "worst case" scenario for seat loss; or conversely. Or. we might combine ·'best case" and "worst case" scenarios using some index of optimism-pessimism to weight the two (luce and Raiffa, 1957) . But all of these measures are fundamenta lly similar to the Index of Competition that we proposed here in that, like that index, they each satisfy the six no rmative properties we laid out at the start of this article. We believe that those six properties are critical in constructing a ful ly general index of competition." Because the population of a. say, an m seat district should be roughly m times the population of a single seat district, normalizing by the Threshold of ExcJusion implicitly takes the parties' calculus to be one of looking at the number of votes needed to gain or lose a seat. rather than at the percentage cha nge in overall vote share in a district needed to gain a seat in that district. If, not implausibly, we believe that parties are more cognizant of percentages than they are of raw votes such a normalization may not seem desirable, For example, creating rurnout incentives in an SMD where a hopeless party needs another 40% to dispute the winner's SNt (c=(O.5 -0.4)/0.5=0.2) as identical to the incentives in a 35-member district where the party needs just another 2.2% to gain a( nother) seat (c = (0.28 -0.22 organizations are the primary mobilizing agents in distrieted electoral systems and that the mobilizing capacities of local party organizations is roughly a function of district size, an Index of Competition th.u expresses mobilization and turnout incentives in relative terms will be a reasonable choice. On the other hand, if we were interested, for example, in how national party organizations distribute campaign expenditures among districts contingent upon their competitiveness. the size of the local electorates probdbly has 10 be taken into account.
In an extension of this paper (calculations omitted for space reasons) we have looked at ;m alternative version of the formulas ",nd calculations given above where there has been no normalization by th~ Thr~shold of Exclusion, i.~.,
Using the non-normalized measure for the Switzerland data eliminates th~ statistical significance of the Threshold of Exclusion variable in Model 2, and indeed yields a slightly bett~r model fit (I of t 15 as compared to 106, with 4 d.f,).
However, it will have to wait for further data ,malyses to see which of the two formulations (normalized versus nonnormalized) most consistently captur~s party and vot~r incentiv~s and better pr~dicts variation in turnout.
In any case, we must be careful to take population differ~nc~s across districts of different magnitudes into account when we are aggregating competitiveness levels across districts of different magnitude, say for purposes of cross-country comparisons. As Grofman (2001 ) points out, if we are interested in the actual number of voters who must change their mind to affect election outcomes, then Threshold of Exclusion values need to be adjusted to take population differences into OIccount across constituencies of different sizes. Within any given country, as we just noted, an m seat district can be expe<:ted to have roughly m times the populOltion of a single seat district. Thus, if we aTe comparing measures of competitiveness aggregated across districts of different sizes then we must further normOllize by weighting eOlch district"s contribution to the overOlIl competitiveness of (incentives for turnout in) the legislOltive elections by mJfS. where 5 is the size of the legislOlture (= E mj)' In this fashion we can create OIn index which is comparOlble across legislatures. 19 'f Noce th at such , in index is not to be confused with n,lfional-Iewl cOlnJ>l'tition indi~ that u~ margins of victory ~twl't'n prospective government and oppositio n parties {e.g. 
